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Representation and Learning 
Susan L. Golbeck1 
Rutgers University 
K. Ann Renninger 
Swarthmore College 
Presumably, one's representation of the world is intimately tied to what one 
has learned. The how and why of this representation in turn informs us about 
the process of learning. However, despite a long standing interest in the 
emergence and development of representational competence, researchers 
are far from having achieved consensus on a definition of the term representa-
tion. Rather, the problem of representation has generated nearly as many 
theories as there are theorists in the field of cognitive development and 
learning. 
In an effort to impose some order upon this confusion, Mandler (1983) 
identified "two senses" of representation. "The first of these," according to 
Mandler, "Refers to knowledge and the way it is organized." Mandler notes 
that this complex conception concerns both what is known and how that 
knowledge is structured. She continues, 
The second usage is the more traditional and familiar one, namely repre-
sentation as the use of symbols. Representation in this sense refers to 
words, artifacts or other symbolic productions that people use to represent 
some aspect of their knowledge of the world. (p. 420) 
Mandler's distinction between these two senses of representation is a 
useful metaphor in that it helps to articulate differences in the foci of those 
participating in discussions of representation and learning, whether these 
discussions are between researchers, theorists or practitioners. However, as 
Paris and Cross (this issue) might point out, this metaphor also has its 
drawbacks. Clearly, those focusing their questions on what is symbolized are 
at the very least making assumptions about how the process of this symboliza-
tion takes place. Alternatively, those focusing their questions on organiza-
tion are also presuming that representational products follow from know-
ledge. 
The articles in this and a forthcoming issue of the Genetic Epistemologist 
are intended to reflect the range of contexts within which questions relating to 
representation and learning are currently being studied. As "working papers" 
they are intended to present an overview of current projects and provoke 
other questions. Each of the following papers illustrates the utility of Mandler's 
two senses of representation in addition to some of the problems of this 
dichotomy. 
1This has been a fully collaborative project. Order of authorship does not reflect a 
senior/junior relationship. 
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Both the Forman and the Downs and Liben papers are primarily concerned 
with representation as the use of symbols. Forman addresses symbols 
generated by the child with the assistance of a computer. Downs and Liben 
discuss children's understanding and misunderstanding of maps. However, 
both papers are specifically concerned with the role of the child's knowledge 
structure as well. In both cases, a failure to consider the knowledge system of 
the child might lead a) to misconceptions about the child's understanding of 
symbolic artifacts, and b) to less than optimal strategies for promoting 
children's developing knowledge of symbols. The authors of these papers 
would probably agree that one cannot understand representation in the 
second sense without reference to the first. 
De Lisi's paper is primarily concerned with the role of others in the young 
child's ability to consciously represent or to conceptualize the means to a 
goal prior to action. To represent here does not refer to the use of a communi-
cative symbol; it does refer to a specific kind of knowledge and its organization. 
Importantly, the child he describes is not engaging in full fledged representa-
tional activity. Instead, De Lisi, in the tradition of Piaget, maintains that the 
child's knowledge system is sensori-motor and still prerepresentational 
(Piaget, 1963). However, the adult assisting the child is engaging in representa-
tional activity and De Lisi describes how the constraints and support provided 
by the adult direct the child's newly emerging representational competence. 
From a somewhat different perspective, Paris and Cross in their analysis of 
the metaphor, zone of proximal development, also argue the need for more 
attention to the role of the social world and interactionist concerns. They 
suggest that metaphors generally, and the zone of proximal development 
more specifically, have many limitations as symbols. When employed by 
developmental theorists and practitioners, a metaphor such as the zone of 
proximal development becomes useful not because of what it represents but 
because of how it helps us reformulate and articulate what we bring to 
another's representation. Like Vygotsky, Paris and Cross do not obviously 
distinguish between representation as knowledge organization and represen-
tation as symbolic artifact. Rather, Paris and Cross are asking us to reflect on 
the implications of the dichotomy and to think more closely about the link 
between representation and the process of learning. 
In conclusion, the four papers in this issue illustrate the diversity of 
problems and approaches falling under the heading of representational 
development. These papers demonstrate the role of representation across 
diverse behaviors and domains of thought. They also reflect a blending of a 
traditional Piagetian constructivist approach with complementary orienta-
tions to domains of specific knowledge and the social context of development. 
Obviously, research within different contexts affords the opportunity to 
address different components of both representation and learning. As editors, 
our hope is that by reading across contexts researchers and practitioners will 
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glean some understanding of complementary approaches to representation 
and learning and will in turn raise questions that are informed by the breadth 
of the topic as it presently exists. 
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